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Abstract:
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Recent analyses of terrorist groups reveal their dependency on complex logistical,
financial, and operational relationships with other groups. Advantaged by the
technological advancements of the last two decades, many terrorist and criminal
organizations are now linked through complicated networks. Therefore, experts dedicated
to uncovering and unraveling terrorist strategy, can easily get lost in the scattered patterns
of today’s terrorism. A web-like structure allows for flexible, though well-connected
leadership, and widespread recruitment opportunity. One recent terrorist group that has
benefited from network organization is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The
IMU was a formidable group because of its experienced and charismatic leadership and
significant fund raising abilities made possible by various criminal ties. A case study of
the rise and fall of the IMU will help to reveal the multifaceted structure of networked
terrorism, particularly in Central Asia and along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border region.
Understanding a group’s ties helps in assessing its true motivations. The IMU was often
characterized as a purely militant Islamic group, when its ties to the drug trade were far
stronger. This study questions the former classification and as a result is useful in
assessing other groups in the region with criminal ties.
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Introduction
To say, in the post-September 11 era, that terrorism has become a topic of increased
discussion and debate, may be the understatement of the young century. While the
4

various mainstream news media bombard the public with vague and often misleading
information regarding terrorist networks, one undeniable truth is consistently clear:
terrorism, as a research topic and as an enemy, is an unconventional study. Furthermore,
trying to navigate the often hysteria driven landscape of terrorism literature can be very
difficult. Terrorism should not be viewed as something new, for it has always existed.
Nor should it be viewed as an act that only a small barbarous group commits, since states
perpetrate terrorism as well. A fair and instructive definition for terrorism is given by
leading expert Bruce Hoffman as “the deliberate exploitation of fear through violence or
the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”1 The IMU fits into the category
of a group seeking to gain power from a state through acts of violence.2
This study will specifically focus on the IMU in Central Asia. The IMU was an
insurgent group that carried out violent attacks against Uzbekistan. It has used armed
struggle and terrorism to try and overthrow the Karimov regime. It claimed to want to
replace it with an Islamic state. The IMU has also been linked to regional Islamic
networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, narcotics networks, and international terrorist
networks such as Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. But, as will be shown, just because there
are links and evidence of a relationship does not mean the two parties are in complete
agreement. The IMU’s gradual increase in the narcotics trade has orientated its
1

See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded edition, 2006, Pg. 40-1. Hoffman continues
arguing that “all terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence . . . specifically designed to have far
reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) . . . meant to instill fear, and thereby
intimidate, a wider “target audience.” Terrorism is a difficult term to define as the literature on it shows.
Key words for a definition often include purposeful, violence, fear, victim, and audience. A definition
should allow for the term to be used broadly, such as coercive violence done by groups and states.
However, Hoffman does define the term as being perpetrated by non-state entities. Jonathan R. White,
Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2006, Pg. 3-7, cites Walter Laqueur who claims it is difficult to define
because the meaning changes through history, and Alex Schmid’s consensus definition where terrorism is
seen “as a method of combat in which the victims serve as symbolic targets.” White concludes simplicity is
preferred. To aid in this the above Hoffman definition will be used.
2
Terrorism perpetrated by a state can be seen in the Uzbekistan government under President Islam
Karimov, often in response to attacks perpetrated or believed to be by the IMU. As will be shown it is
clearly debatable whether the IMU’s main focus was political.
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motivations away from a purely political nature. This is not an isolated case, but an
example of how a group operating outside the law, has adapted to a post-Cold War
environment. However, the IMU’s life span was cut short by the U.S.-led campaign
against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. This resulted in the death of the IMU’s military
commander, Juma Namangani, the destruction of their bases, and the dispersal of the
remaining members. Although severely weakened its remaining members and support
base in the Fergana valley and region could be a destabilizing force in the future for
Central Asia.
This study will have four distinct parts. The first will consist of an investigation of
current network theory, and how it applies to terrorist and criminal entities. Second, a
brief history of the region will aid in providing background to the IMU. It will include the
Soviet-Afghan War, the rise of Islamic networks along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border,
the collapse of Soviet power in Central Asia, and the narcotics trade in the region. Third,
basic network theories will be used in a case study of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, and how the IMU fits into the broader criminal and Islamic networks of
Central Asia. Drawing upon network analysis, the conclusions from this study will help
to increase our understanding of the IMU’s structure and its myriad of relationships.
These conclusions, particularly the IMU’s narcotic ties, will demonstrate its dual nature
as a terrorist and criminal group, and how the IMU is a good example of the increasing
overlap between terrorist and criminal groups since the end of the Cold War.3

3

For a similar study about terrorism and criminal networks in the Caucasus see Colleen M. Traughber,
Terror-Crime Nexus?: Terrorism and Arms, Drug, and Human Trafficking in Georgia, Masters of Arts in
Law Diplomacy Thesis, Spring 2007, The Fletcher School, Tufts University.
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1 Network theory
What is a network? At its most basic level a network is “a collection of objects connected
to each other in some fashion.”4 Under such broad guidelines anything can be a network.
Social networks focus on human interaction and the relationships that arise from them.
Theories on how social networks operate are some of the newest ideas today. Many of
these theories are the best ways we have currently to describe and understand specific
human interaction. Mark Buchanan, author of Nexus, describes how experiments and
research in many different fields of study, including math, physics, biology, and the
social sciences, have overlapped; and leading numerous scientists “to talk meaningfully
about the architecture of networks of all kinds, and to perceive important patterns and
regularities where they could see none before.”5
For the purposes of the social sciences this new theory is helping to advance the
study of relationships among individuals and how, in this case terrorists and criminals,
interact and use their networks of relations to their benefit. Buchanan mentions current
global political trends and the breaking down effect terrorism, multinational corporations,
and information technologies have on nation-state power.6 “We face a decentralized
network of terrorist cells that lacks . . . hierarchical command structure and is distributed
through out the world.”7 Still, the basic building blocks to a network, i.e. nodes (actors)
and links (ties), need explanation. A node can be an individual or group, and on paper

4

Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees, 2003, Pg. 27. Regardless of the objects in question certain elements are
universal, such as hubs, clusters, and strong and weak ties. Each will be described below. For more see
Watts, and Mark Buchanan, Nexus, 2002.
5
Buchanan, Pg. 19.
6
Buchanan, Pg. 21. See also Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorism and Organized Crime: the emerging nexus,”
in Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism, ed.
Paul Smith, Hawaii: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2002. She argues that “the territorial
sovereignty of state actors has been questioned . . . and the state as the central focus of international affairs
has given way to a host of non-state actors.”
7
Ibid.
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would appear as a dot, while a link, represented as a line, is the connection between two
nodes.8 The question then becomes how strong is the link between two nodes in which
information or ideas are often exchanged. A simple example will help answer this
question.

Figure 1:

A=B
|
C=D

to

A= B
|
|
C=D

The diagram above has two individuals, A and B, and they both are acquainted
with one another.9 But how well are they acquainted? The link between them, or the tie
strength “would largely be governed by the amount of time spent together by the pair.”10
Strong links would have regular interaction, such as family ties, while weak links would
have less interaction. A good way to visualize link strength is to envision a spectrum
scale with one side being strong and the other weak and varying degrees of strength in
between. The interesting thing is that the weak links are more important than the stronger
ones. Why? To explain this let us add two more individuals, C and D, to our previous
example. A and B have a strong link, because they are brothers, and C and D have a
strong link because they have worked together for the last ten years. But B and C know
each other because they fought together in the military and knew each other about two
years. The link then, between B and C is weak since they see each other once or twice a
year. To continue, say A asks B for help on something and B is sure C can assist. B then
goes to C, or gets A into contact with C. Because of meeting through B, A and C become
acquaintances and soon D comes into contact with the other three. After three or four
8

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy, Rand, 2001, Pg 316.
9
Buchanan, Pg. 30.
10
Valdis E. Krebs, Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, First Monday, vol. 7, No. 4, Apr. 2002.
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meetings where all four attend they all decide to form a group and pursue a cause of their
choosing. Thus, as Buchanan concludes, citing research in the field, “weak links are often
of greater importance than strong links because they act as the crucial ties that sew the
social network together.”11 If it were not for B and C’s relationship, the group probably
would not have been formed.

Figure 2: Group 1
Group 2
A=B - - - - - E=F
| |
\ |
C=D
G
S
Hubs are centrally located nodes with many strong and weak links.12 To add to the
model A, B, C, and D, form Group One, which has made B in charge of acquiring
supplies for the group. B then gets into contact with other individuals who may be able to
help, such as E, a member of another group and S, a lone supplier. The interaction
between Groups One, Two, and S are all linked together through B, who is acting as the
hub.
Clusters, also called a clustered network, is “mostly comprised of strong links
between people, endowed with history and cemented with frequent interaction.”13 Such
ties often create a high trust level and cooperation between members.14 This allows for the
clustered group to accomplish its desired goals and to be more productive. Group One
has become a clustered group. As a whole it has developed trust, while the relationships
between A/B, and C/D already have a higher level of trust because of there past history.

11

Buchanan, Pg. 43.
Buchanan, Pg. 123-4.
13
Buchanan, Pg. 202.
14
Buchanan, Pg. 200-4.
12

9

Duncan J. Watts points out in his book, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected
Age, that what is different about today’s understanding of networks is they are not static,
but “continuously evolving.”15 Referring back to the diagram, one could ask, what are the
intentions of Group One? In order to better answer this question understanding the
histories of the four individuals who comprise it, how they all met, and their environment
is necessary. Therefore, viewing a network as continuously doing something, such as
exchanging ideas, money, or information, rather than as a static entity, reveals a far more
accurate picture of the network. Such a picture aids in answering what a groups intentions
are, and even more importantly, what a groups capabilities are.
A simple social network should have strong links at least between two to three
members, forming a cluster, and have at least one individual that can be identified as a
hub. More advanced networks would expand upon this simple model and require some
amount of differentiation. Further description of a more advanced network and its
components will be explained below. This definition, while recognizable in all human
networks, helps to narrow our focus to describe networks that operate outside the law.

Terrorist and Criminal Networks:
Two defense scholars, John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, have studied threats
to society such as terrorism and organized crime from a social network perspective for
the last few decades. From their research they have proposed a different understanding to
this phenomenon, which they call ‘netwar’:
“refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional
military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related
doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists
are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals who
15

Watts, Pg. 29.
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communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often
without a precise central command.”16

The above description provides a good definition for a terrorist network in today’s world.
Their netwar premise was something Arquilla and Ronfeldt had repeatedly proposed in
early research throughout the 1990’s. One of the main intentions was to “call attention to
the prospect that networked based conflict and crime will become a major phenomenon
in the decades ahead.”17 Published just prior to the September 11 attacks, many of the
current threats faced by the United States from terrorist, and other non-state actors, have
validated much of this theory. Their work is broad and covers not only terrorist and
criminal groups, but also new anarchist and environmental radicals and activists.
However, according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt there is a similar underlying pattern among
these groups, “the use of network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and
technology attuned to the information age.”18
In addition to the terms mentioned above there are other important characteristics
of a social network. First, there are three basic organizational designs. The chain network
is a smuggling chain where people, goods, or information move along a line of separated
contacts.19 A star network is a set of actors that are tied to a central (but not hierarchical)
node, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other.20
The all-channel network is essentially when everybody in the group is connected to

16

Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Pg. 6.
Ibid.
18
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Pg. 7.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
17

11

everybody else.21 It is important to point out that many combinations and variants are
possible among the three designs.22
Two other typical characteristics of a network are that it has a core and a
periphery. To differentiate these two zones the network has to be of substantial size and
reflect a power center.23 The core, or decision-making body, guides the network and is
defined by “bonding mechanisms that help to create high degrees of trust and cohesion”
among its members.24 This is similar to Buchanan’s clusters of strong links, norms, and
expectations.25
The network periphery is just the opposite of the core and contains less dense
patterns of interaction and more casual relationships, but this zone has a critical role in a
network, exploiting ‘the strength of weak ties.’26 These ties “allow the network to operate
at a far greater distance – both geographically and socially – than would otherwise be the
case.”27 As groups become more transnational in character they depend on these weak ties
for success. For example, narcotics networks transport heroin from Afghanistan where it
is grown, to the streets of Europe where it is sold. Such a long journey for the heroin
could not occur with out a series of weak ties.
Divisions of labor among members are another common feature to networks.28 It
is possible to distinguish certain roles that are crucial to the function of a given network.
Much of this research has derived from analysis of organized crime, but similar

21

Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Pg. 7-8.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Pg. 8.
23
Phil Williams in Networks and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt eds., Pg. 72.
24
Ibid.
25
Buchanan, Pg. 202.
26
Phil Williams in Networks and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt eds., Pg. 73, and Buchanan both cite
Mark Granovetter’s ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ (1973) when discussing this term.
27
Phil Williams in Networks and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt eds., Pg. 73.
28
Phil Williams in Networks and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt eds., Pg. 82.
22
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inferences can be made to the world of terrorist organizations. Such roles as organizer,
the planner, and communicator, the one who passes commands from the top leadership to
the rest of the group, are obvious, but other key roles are not so well known.29 For
example, an extender, the individual whose role it is to extend the network by recruiting
new members, and the crossovers, the individuals who have been recruited into a
network but who continue to operate in legal institutions, whether governmental,
financial, or commercial.30 Even more specific specialties are often required such as a
bomb maker, or computer expert, which further divides the networks labor needs.
Identifying what role an individual plays helps law and intelligence agencies in
designating which roles are vital to monitor.31

Growing alliances:
The rise of ‘the matrix of relationships’ is a key factor to describe today’s
terrorists groups. 32 This interaction became more prevalent in the 1970s and has only
continued to spread and evolve. A good example is Carlos Ramirez, (aka the Jackal). At
the peak of his fame in the 1970s he had numerous connections and interactions with

29

Phil Williams in Networks and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt eds., Pg. 82-3. In addition to organizers,
communicators, extenders, and crossovers, there are insulators, who role it is to keep the core from being
compromised, guardians, whose concern is with the security of the group and network, and monitors, who
ensure the effectiveness of the network and report to the core weaknesses and problems that need to be
fixed.
30
Ibid. See Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, Yale University Press, 2002, Pg. 142-3, as example of crossover role,
which was very important as Tajik government officials aided the IMU, such as Mirzo Ziyoyev, head of the
Emergency Ministry.
31
Stuart Koschade, A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah, Studies in Conflict and Terror, Pg.
560.
32
Matthew Levitt, Untangling the Terror Web, SAIS Review, 2004, Pg. 34. This article points out that
careful study of the matrix unveils that “key nodes” are preferred facilitators for multiple terrorists and
terrorist groups in executing operations. Al Qaeda is an example of this as it forged relationships with many
groups throughout the world.
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many different groups and individuals.33 Although groups may have different goals and
histories, they very often have similar needs. Weapons, training sites, technical expertise,
and intelligence are a few of what is commonly shared. When it comes to Islamic groups
there is even more intersection of interaction and support since they often have family or
clan ties and religion in common.34
Just as interaction between terrorist groups has increased so has the activity
between terrorist groups and organized crime.35 Such interaction has always occurred and
many experts believe it to be rising.36 This rise suggests a new trend is emerging that is
questioning how each, terrorists and criminals, is viewed as threats on the international
stage. Tamara Makarenko, a leading scholar on terrorist/criminal cooperation, has
proposed a new model that helps to explain the emerging threats that interact, and at
times converge.37 The Crime Terror Continuum (CTC) illustrates major relationships that
exist between the terrorist and criminal worlds, “from strategic cooperation and alliance
formations to the complete convergence of motivations.”38 While political and religious
33

Ovid Demaris, Brothers in Blood, 1977, Pg. 59-60. Bassam Abu Sharif, a leader for the PFLP (Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine), has said, “In our business people like Carlos are indispensable, and
we have people like him everywhere.” Carlos was just one of many who formed a ‘terrorist bank’ from
which specific people or groups could draw from for various operations. Demaris, Pg. 22, Carlos is
believed to have had ties to the Soviet KGB as well as Cuban Intelligence, Palestinian groups, the Japanese
Red Army, the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and Turkish and Basque separatist
movements. Makarenko, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: the emerging nexus, 2002, also
historically frames this phenomenon as starting in the 1970s.
34
Levitt, Pg. 36. This article also gives many examples of network relationships among many Islamic
terrorist groups. Walter Lacqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 1987, Pg. 286-7fn. Lacqueur notes Mid-East
groups very often have familiar and clannish ties, which stay the same even when doctrines or ideology
changes.
35
Makarenko, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: the emerging nexus, 2002, defines
organized crime as “consisting of at least three or more people that are gathered for a prolonged period of
time . . . suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences with the object of pursuing profit
and/or power.”
36
See Thomas M. Sanderson, Transnational Terror and Organized Crime, SAIS, 2004, Pg. 49. Makarenko,
Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: the emerging nexus, 2002, and Chris Dishman, The
Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28: 237-252
2005, which also emphasize increasing terrorist and criminal cooperation.
37
Makarenko, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: the emerging nexus, 2002.
38
Ibid.
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concerns often motivate terrorist groups, and profit the motive for crime rings, their
operation outside the law often creates the need for similar resources.39 Network
connections involving terrorists and criminals are not just made on ideological lines but
cover a spectrum of reasons for existence.40 This model will be used to analyze the IMU’s
motivations later in the study.

Crime Terror Continuum41
Organized Crime
|
alliances with
terrorist group

Terrorism
-

|
use of terror
tactics

CONVERGENCE
|
‘Black Hole’

|
political crime

|
use of criminal
activities

|
alliances with
organized crime

|
commercial terrorism

There are two major reasons for the growing cooperation. Since the end of the
Cold War groups that often receive money, aid, and/or shelter from either side has ended.
The second reason is since September 11, many sources for terrorist funding have been
frozen, or more closely monitored causing groups to look elsewhere for funds.42 In order
to maintain existence terrorist groups have looked to other sources for funds, such as
organized crime, and shelter in failed states rather than rely on state sponsorship. The end
of the bipolar economic structure has also allowed organized crime to expand into new

39

Sanderson, Pg. 53.
Sanderson, Pg. 54. His article mentions the IRA and FARC, and al Qaeda and Hezbollah as examples of
terrorist and/or criminal organizations cooperating.
41
Tamara Makarenko, A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1,
2003. The four general crime-terror relationships are alliances, operational tactics, motivational
convergence, and ‘black hole’. Black hole is a point that the convergence between criminal and political
motivations with in a single group allows it to gain economic and political control over a state.
42
Sanderson, Pg. 50.
40
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areas, and thus putting them in more frequent contact with a range of political groups.
Slow liberal-democratic reform in many of the former Soviet-bloc nations, such as
Central Asia, has created weak and corrupt governments and an environment suitable for
organized crime to flourish.
A third crucial factor is the rise of information technology and increased
connectivity from globalization since the end of the Cold War. This has allowed for
terrorist and criminal groups to have transnational capabilities that few had before, and
allowed both the ability to challenge nation-state power. The transnational element has
made such resources as false identification, shipping documents, and transportation
networks in high demand and furthered cooperation between criminal and terrorist
groups.43 Finally, the dealing of narcotics, a known cornerstone of organized crime, is a
common alternative increasingly used by terrorist groups.44 This trade combines many
elements previously discussed, facilitates interaction, transnational in character, and a
lucrative business providing quick and large sums of money. It will be dealt with later in
the study.
Research on terrorist and criminal networks has grown, particularly since
September 11. Studies by Makarenko, Cornell, Koschade, Pedahzur and Perliger, and
journals such as Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, have expanded the field.45 They
include investigating for patterns, identifying central hubs, and mapping and measuring
relationships in terrorist and criminal groups. But, Arquilla and Ronfeldt are quick to
43

Ibid.
Sanderson, Pg. 52.
45
See Makarenko, A model for terrorist-criminal relations, 2003; Svante E. Cornell, Narcotics and Armed
Conflict: Interaction and Implications, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30:207-227, 2007; Stuart
Koschade, A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counter-Terrorism and
Intelligence, Studies in Conflict and Terror, 29:559-575, Pg. 559-61; Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, The
Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective, Social Forces, Vol. 84, No. 4; also see
Saxena, Sudhir, K. Santhanam and Aparna Basu, Application of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to Terror
Networks in Jammu & Kashmir, Strategic Analysis, Pg. 87.
44
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mention, “there is no standard methodology for analyzing network forms of
organization.”46 Their research “indicates that the design and performance of such
networks depend on what happens across five levels of analysis.”47 These levels are
organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological, and social.48 Arquilla and Ronfeldt
conclude that for a network to function well all five levels must be integrated.49 This fivepoint methodology, although not perfect, gives a basis for more acute study of terrorist
networks.

2 Nexus origins
Before any analysis of a social network can begin it is necessary to understand the
physical environment of the network.50 The IMU grew out of the post-Cold War
landscape. The aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War, an Islamic revival in Central Asia,
the existing narcotics trade, and the Afghan Civil War all influenced the creation and rise
of the IMU.

The Soviet-Afghan War:
The Soviet Red Army invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve of 1979 to prop up
the Marxist regime that had come to power in an April 1978 coup. The Communist
government of Afghanistan was struggling to maintain law and order as a result of its

46

Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Pg. 323.
Ibid.
48
See Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Pg. 324-343. The five levels are: organizational, meaning its organizational
design; narrative, meaning the story being told; doctrinal, meaning the collaborative strategies and
methods; technological, meaning the information systems used; and social, meaning the personal ties that
assure loyalty and trust.
49
Ibid.
50
Koschade, Pg. 562.
47
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attempt at Marxist reforms on a poor and uneducated population. Prior to the Soviet
invasion, growing unrest had been building from the population. Although the Soviet
leadership was certainly aware of the recent Iranian Revolution and its own large Muslim
population and factored both into their decision-making, they were more concerned about
U.S. aid and influence replacing theirs in Afghanistan than an Islamic revival challenging
their power. Trapped by Cold War strategy and the current Afghanistan regime losing
control, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev authorized the invasion.51 The Soviets were not
expecting such international outrage, nor were they prepared for the resistance that
followed.52
The U.S. response to the invasion called for the CIA, with funds from Saudi
Arabia, to work through Pakistan and its intelligence service, the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI). Weapons and other supplies were sent to aid the Afghan resistance, the
mujahideen.53 In addition to weapons, money, and supplies, camps were set up along the
Afghan border run by the ISI to help train the mujahideen.54 The conflict quickly became
a war of attrition and lasted almost ten years with neither side achieving any decisive
victories. Negotiations for an end to the war started in 1987, finalized in 1988, and by
early 1989 the Soviets had withdrawn.55
In the wake of the war lay an environment replete with refugees, bands of
fighters, and stockpiled weaponry. The Communist Afghan regime was struggling to
maintain power in Kabul, while Pakistan’s ISI was trying to capitalize on the Soviet

51

Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban,
2002, Pg. 233.
52
Tanner, Pg. 241.
53
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 2004, Pg. 58. This book is considered by many to provide the best over all
history of the Soviet-Afghan War to date.
54
Coll, Pg. 64.
55
Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, Perennial, 2002, Pg. 233.
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withdrawal and secure a favorable regime to its west. Loose alliances between the many
factions of mujahideen were quickly dissipating with the exit of their common enemy.
Although Islam was a commonality among most in the region, numerous sects and
divisions existed within. The region was radicalized politically from the war especially
along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border where the majority of refugee and training camps
were still present. Many political and religious views grew out of the war torn landscape.
Three important and interdependent features assisted the rise of radical sentiment that laid
the foundations for an Islamic network to grow.
First, the camps built to train mujahideen were not abandoned or dismantled when
the Soviets left Afghanistan. Instead the camps stayed and were maintained by the ISI.
The ISI continued to train recruits for the civil war in Afghanistan and for Pakistan’s
fight with India in Kashmir. Training camps on the Afghan side of the border were
heavily influenced by the ISI, and at no time from their “conception to their destruction”
by U.S. bombs in late 2001 were they empty. 56 Physical places to meet and train became
sanctuaries for individuals seeking training in jihad, and to more focused individuals who
desired to commit deadlier acts. Initially, these camps drew veterans from the SovietAfghan war.
It was these former veterans that became the second important feature of the
growing radical landscape. Many foreign fighters could not return home for fear of arrest,
so they stayed in Pakistan or Afghanistan.57 Several took positions in Muslim charities
varying in the level of legitimacy, in cities such as Peshawar, Pakistan and Jalalabad,
Afghanistan.58 In so doing the veterans stayed in contact with other like-minded
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individuals. The relationships forged during the war were becoming stronger, providing a
precursor for the core of network formation.
The third significant aspect hinged on individuals interpretations of jihad
philosophy.59 Originally, jihad had inspired many foreign fighters and Afghans and
Pakistanis regardless of piety or theological understanding. However, the war helped to
facilitate a more rigid interpretation of jihad. Radical and charismatic preachers who had
also come to take part in the fight against the Soviets took advantage of such changes in
the beliefs. The preachers cultivated and inspired new arrivals that were often
uneducated.60 This new idea of jihad, one that called for constant battle with the enemies
of Islam, was rising in prominence among many of the foreign mujahideen. 61 The
apparent defeat of the Soviets by the mujahideen furthered the belief of the “spirit of
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jihad.”62 However, this understanding of the events fails to take into consideration all of
the players involved.63
Even with the Soviet withdrawal and the mujahideen’s perceived victory, radical
sentiment only increased in the region.64 The network that had coalesced to fight the
Communist threat was now taking on new enemies. The metamorphosis that took place in
the aftermath of the war included a shift of power within the existing establishment.
Furthermore, the network began decentralizing, allowing for the inclusion of the less
significant actors that also used it.65 Numerous entrepreneurs, (so to speak), such as the
ISI, former mujahideen, drug barons, tribal leaders, and wealthy Gulf Arabs, were now
taking advantage of the network for more local and/or personal reasons. At the heart of
this Islamic network was the Pakistan/Afghanistan border from which many meetings
took place. These meetings, acting as sanctuaries, made possible the actual transfer of
ideas, information, and funds. A key urban center in this region was the Pakistan city of
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Peshawar, which lies just east of the Khyber Pass.66 It was used for this purpose during
the war and continued to be in its aftermath. Peshawar remains a key hub in the
Pakistan/Afghanistan Islamic network that began in the 1980s.67

Islamic Revival:
During Soviet rule Central Asia had been closed off from the rest of the Muslim
world. The region had a state-supervised Islam, which was heavily regulated, and a
parallel Islam (underground) that was based upon local long-held traditions. Soviet
policies wrought havoc to the Muslim traditions, which for the majority of the population
was a major source of its identity.68 The breakdown of religious traditions made the
region susceptible to other influences such as religious extremism and organized crime.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left an “ideological, intellectual, and institutional
vacuum” and further made the people and region vulnerable.69 The people of Central Asia
began to explore other political systems and ideologies and much of that was channeled
into Islamic sentiment. This religious rival of sorts was not embraced by the former
Communists, now the ‘democratic’ rulers of the Central Asian republics. Most of the new
states continued their authoritarian ways while in Tajikistan, independence led to civil
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war.70 But Uzbekistan also faced an organized threat of Islamic extremism from the
Fergana valley.71

Narcotics Trade:
As these turbulent times held the attention of governments and their populace,
another network was growing beneath the surface. The narcotics trade, an unwelcome
topic of discussion in the region, was gathering prominence. Under British rule in the 18th
century, opium was regulated and encouraged in the trade between India and China.
When independence came to India and Pakistan in 1947, most of their policies on illegal
drugs were carried over from British reign. Although illegal, enforcement of drug laws
was not a priority. This all changed when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the
legacies of the colonial opium trade combined with U.S. Cold War strategy.72
Pakistan had two pressing issues to deal with, coordinate and supply the unruly
mujahideen. In Afghanistan mujahideen groups and foreign fighters were dependent on
aid from others. Hence encouraging the production of opium generated money and did so
at the local level. But this would have unintended consequences. The money generated
was used to buy weapons, food, and other supplies while making some mujahideen
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groups more self-sufficient.73 The growing of opium was a common practice in the region
among the Pashtun tribes.74 These tribes lived on either side of the Pakistan/Afghanistan
border.75 Once the demand for opium crops went up it would be hard for the Pashtun
tribes and the Pakistan government to expect other crops to be grown. Opium, which did
not yield much of a profit for the local farmer, still brought in more money to live on than
did any other crop.
The narcotics trade steadily grew as the war continued, but the majority of the aid
to the mujahideen still came from the CIA-ISI program. By the mid-1980s, the trade was
increasingly evident as the Pakistan government tried to downplay direct involvement.76
The ISI oversaw the drug trade like it did other aid networks created to fund and supply
the mujahideen. For example, money from the United States and Saudi Arabia would be
used to purchase weapons from China or Egypt. The weapons and other supplies would
be shipped to the Pakistan port city of Karachi. There the shipments would be loaded on
to trucks for the training camps and drop off points near the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.
But the trucks would not leave empty. Some would be filled with opium or heroin on
route back to Karachi. Since the trucks had special ISI papers giving the loads immunity
from searches most shipments going in either direction traveled unmolested. When the
war ended the drug network continued to function as it had become intertwined with the
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mujahideen networks.77 As a result many ranking Pakistani military officials became
involved, corrupted by the large sums of drug money and graft from U.S. aid.78
The narcotics trade is clearly linked to the other clandestine programs involved in
defeating the Soviets. But, as long as the Soviets were in Afghanistan, U.S. policy makers
did not care where the money or support came from to aid the mujahideen, even if it
stoked the fires of radical Islam or perpetuated the drug trade. It is important to note that
the war aided, but did not create the growing drug syndicates. These syndicates had
refinement capabilities, transportation to world markets, and at minimum, complicity by
some in the Pakistan government. Coincidentally, much of the means to grow and refine
the opium was in the same semi-autonomous tribal areas along the Pakistan/Afghanistan
border, where the camps, veterans, radical sentiment, and millions of refugees were all in
close proximity.79 Frontier cities such as Quetta and Peshawar were hubs for illicit drug
enterprises as well.80

Networks Merge:
The civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990’s only hardened the drug trade and
utilized many elements of the networks described above. It was fought between a varying
combination of opposing local warlords81 (former mujahideen) and regional powers,
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particularly Pakistan and Iran. The different interests involved carved out their own
fiefdoms, resulting in alliances of convenience and safe havens for foreign groups. With
the infrastructure destroyed by years of conflict and a lack of strong central government,
the continuation of opium production persisted. When the Taliban came to power they
taxed the trade, while the Northern Alliance invested heavily in it, and Pakistani dealers
refined the opium and transported it to world markets. The narcotics trade and safe
havens, which would come to be used by al-Qaeda, the IMU, and other groups, became
prevalent factors in the region. Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghan affairs, sums up the
consequences of the continued conflict in Afghanistan. He writes,
“several different conflicts became linked through flows of people, arms, ideology, and
resources. Such networks crisscrossed Afghanistan, reaching into all the surrounding
countries.”82

Conditions were such in Afghanistan that everything was interrelated and fed off each
other. The years of fighting had eroded many formal state structures such as central
government, law enforcement, and infrastructure. Instead power (political control) was
achieved by the strongest parties, which in Afghanistan were the warlords, drug lords,
and smuggling mafias. Thus, the drug trade was secure, as were the training camps, safe
havens, refugees and extremist sentiment to the landscape of the Pakistan/Afghanistan
border region.
The shifting tides of the Cold War saw Soviet influence wane, and independence
thrust many challenges on the new governments and people of Central Asia. Some of
these social predicaments included high unemployment, uncertainty, and tribal
Revisited II: Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of Governance, Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach
eds., INEF Report 89/2007, provides further discussion of warlords; as does Kimberly Marten, Warlordism
in Comparative Perspective, International Security, Winter 2006/07, Vol. 31, No. 3, Pg. 41-73. Although
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82
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differences, while other issues brewed from the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Still the biggest question was what role would Islam play?83 The heart of Central Asia, the
Fergana Valley, was historically known for strong religious sentiment. Much of the
young population was demanding more political representation. The political climate was
ripe for a showdown between the Uzbek government and the Islamic extremists.

3 The IMU Emerges
The IMU was a terrorist group that directed its operations and violent attacks against the
Uzbekistan government. Its leaders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani met in the
Namangan Uprising in the spring of 1992. As a result of their involvement in the failed
uprising they were forced to leave Uzbekistan with their followers. Between 1992-97
Tahir and Juma stayed in contact with each other as Juma fought on the side of the
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the Tajik Civil War (1992-97), while Tahir traveled in
the region settling in Peshawar from 1995-8. The IMU was formed in 1997 with an
estimated 500-1000 member fighters. Its headquarters was in northern Afghanistan and
had the blessing of the Taliban regime.
The IMU’s first major armed incursion, led by Juma Namangani, with small arms,
and operating out of forward bases in Tajikistan, was in the summer of 1999. Small bands
of fighters infiltrated the Fergana valley, attacked border posts, and took hostages.
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Similar incursions occurred again in the summer of 2000, which struck even closer to the
capital Tashkent. By this time it was clear that the IMU was now heavily involved with
the opium trade from Afghanistan. The group’s activities were not matching its strong
political rhetoric calling for the overthrow of the Karimov regime with an Islamic state.
Instead it appeared the IMU was moving in a more criminal direction with its increasing
ties to the drug trade.
By the summer of 2001, the IMU had grown closer to the Taliban and al-Qaeda
and was aiding them in their struggle to defeat the Northern Alliance. Still, the IMU
maintained its ties to the drug trade, suggesting it had at least two wings, one political and
one criminal. Due to the IMU alliance with the Taliban and al-Qaeda it was targeted by
the United States in 2001. This resulted in the death of Juma, the destruction of their
bases, and dispersal of the remaining members. The loss of a key leader and safe haven
forced the remnants to decentralize.
A suspected splinter cell of the IMU, Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), claimed
responsibility for the spring and summer 2004 bombings in Tashkent, and a failed attack
in July of 2005. An Internet message in September 2006 by Yuldashev, believed to be
hiding in the tribal areas of Pakistan, attacked the Central Asian regimes and allies of the
U.S. in the region. Yet, the decentralized remnants/cells of the IMU seem to have lost
their effectiveness on the political front.
This provokes the question: how should violent attacks attributed to the IMU be
interpreted? First, it depends on how the IMU is defined, as a group, network, or
movement.84 Such differentiation aids in understanding the range of activities, from
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criminal acts to terrorist violence, seen in Central Asia in the last fifteen years. The
following history of activities involving the IMU is meant to provide a background for
making assertions about the IMU.
The rise and fall of the IMU can be split up into four different phases. This
breakdown aids in describing its maturity over time as a group. By overcoming
challenges and continuing to operate in an often violent and difficult environment the
IMU developed as a group, gained experience, and a sense of responsibility and
stability.85 This maturity was advantageous in that it provided the IMU with credibility to
associate with other groups, often criminal and terrorist like itself, in the region.86

Revival and Revolt: Late 1989 to March 1992
This period centers around the Islamic revival that was described in Part Two. The
growing tension between the former Communist governments and the new opposition
parties resulted in the Namangan Revolt in the spring of 1992. Militant Islamic groups
led the revolt in the Fergana Valley. Initially these groups reflected a broad political
spectrum of goals that ranged from representation to Islamic revolution. They emerged
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out of Gorbachev’s Glasnost period of the late 1980’s.87 The first political party formed in
Uzbekistan was the Islamic Revival Party (IRP), in January 1991.88 It had moderate
positions, which didn’t call for an Islamic state, and tried to work with the government.
The young militants did not support these positions.89 Instead they formed their own
underground religious-political groups: Adolat (Justice) and its armed wing Islam
Lashkarlary (Fighters for Islam), Tauba (Repentance), and Hizb-i-Islami (Party for
Islam).90 They formed into small militias and challenged the local state authorities in the
cities of Namangan, Margelan, and Andijan. Also, by this time most of the mosques in
the valley were in the control of the militant groups, and the groups appeared to be
gaining support from the population as mosques were filled for Friday prayer.91
The movement was being led by Adolat, whose leader was a charismatic 24-yearold underground imam named Tahir Yuldashev.92 In addition to Yuldashev, another
prominent young figure was Juma Hojiev (later he changed his name to Namangani), a
former Soviet paratrooper who had fought in Afghanistan.93 The militant groups, roughly
300-500 strong,94 put out bolder statements and believed they could overthrow the
Karimov government.95 In December of 1991 the militants took over the Communist
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Party headquarters in Namangan.96 The militants continued with their police actions by
punishing criminals and enforcing Islamic head coverings among women.97 Tashkent’s
cautious response only strengthened the militant’s momentum.98 By all accounts of the
government reactions they did not seem to understand what was happening in the
Fergana valley.99
The conflict peaked in early 1992 when President Karimov came to Namangan to
give a speech and to try and calm the situation. Present was Yuldashev who insulted
Karimov and grabbed the microphone from his hands, interrupting the speech, and
shouted “now we shall speak, and you shall listen.”100 Embarrassed by the incident and
not wanting to appear weak in front of rivals the uprising was finally addressed by
Karimov. By March of that year the Karimov regime aggressively went after the radicals
and any group associated with political Islam. Adolat was officially banned and 27
members arrested while the remaining membership went underground or fled to
neighboring Tajikistan.101 The revolt is an important event for its participants. For Tahir,
Juma and other individuals who took part it was an experience they all had in common.
Just as the fighters from the Soviet-Afghan War had a shared experience so to did the
individuals involved with the revolt. The core of the IMU was built from this shared
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experience, while some were caught, many stayed together as a group when the fled to
Tajikistan.

Growth Period: March 1992 – 1997
This phase is best characterized by the relationships Tahir Yuldashev and Juma
Namangani cultivated in the region. They fled south with their followers to Tajikistan in
March 1992. There they separated, Juma spent most of his time in Tajikistan and Tahir
traveling to Afghanistan and then Pakistan, but still maintained a relationship. This
growth period ends with the formal creation of the IMU.
The newly independent state of Tajikistan was soon embroiled in civil war (199297). Namangani and his followers would take the side of the Islamic opposition, which
were part of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).102 During the war Juma was involved in
many major battles to include one of the biggest for Haboribot Pass in 1993.103 The
conflict enabled Juma and his fighters to bond with other like-minded individuals. Juma
had made ties with two important Tajik military commanders Mirzo Ziyoyev, and Hakim
Kalindarov.104 Mirzo Ziyoyev made Juma his first deputy in 1996,105 and aided Juma in
setting up bases in the Tajik towns of Karategin, Hoit, Tajikobad, and Tavildara.106
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Tahir Yuldashev spent a brief period in Dushambe, the Tajik capital, before
leaving when the war broke out in May 1992.107 He fled to Taloqan, Afghanistan, where
he helped in the Tajik opposition headquarters.108 By 1995 Tahir was residing in
Peshawar where he would stay till 1998.109 It was during these three years in Peshawar
that the Jamiat-I-Ulema Islami (JUI), an extreme Pakistani organization, would help to
raise funds for Yuldashev while his followers would go to the JUI madrassahs.110
Yuldashev would also meet Afghan-Arabs who are believed to have introduced him to
other Afghan mujahideen groups and bin Laden.111 Throughout the mid-1990s Yuldashev
was ‘networking’ in the Pakistan/Afghan border region where militant ideas were
prevalent. What is important about Tahir’s relationship building is making a connection
with the right node/individual. It was easier for him to meet militant individuals in the
border region because many had stayed.112 Sageman argues, “social bonds are the critical
element in this process and precede ideological commitment.”113
The Tajik Civil War finally reached a peace settlement in 1997. Namangani and
his fighters were upset with the terms, but eventually accepted.114 He stayed in Tajikistan
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after the war, and became involved in the transportation of heroin through the region.115
Yuldashev soon met with Namangani to discuss “their future course of action.”116 The
decision was made to form the IMU for three reasons. The end of the Tajik Civil War
meant staying in Tajikistan would be more difficult. Two, there was continued
suppression of any political Islamic activity in Uzbekistan by the Karimov regime. Third,
the Taliban were now in control of Kabul, Afghanistan. Tahir supported the Taliban from
his time in Peshawar, and believed they would be more reliable to his cause.117 The newly
formed IMU was now about to test the relationships Tahir and Juma had built over the
last five years.

The Campaign Period: 1998 – Summer 2001
The IMU was at the peak of its power during this time. The individuals committed to the
IMU were believed responsible for the 1999 Tashkent bombings, and conducted major
campaigns, from 1999-2001, into the Fergana valley. Tahir had secured permission from
the Taliban to operate bases in northern Afghanistan, while Juma stayed in Tajikistan for
the immediate future.118 Tahir also continued to align the IMU with the Taliban and bin
Laden’s al-Qaeda ideology throughout this period.119
Tahir moved to Kabul in 1998 where the Taliban gave him a residence.120 It was
during that summer that he formalized the creation of the IMU and declared jihad against
115

Rashid, Jihad, Pg. 144. It is believe the money generated from the trade was used to fund his fighters.
Rashid, Jihad, Pg. 145.
117
Rashid, Jihad, 145-9, goes into more detail but lists these major reasons as being what originally created
the IMU. Ilkhamov, Pg. 45, also mentions the end of the war, the government Uzbekistan crackdown, and
the shift from Massoud to the Taliban.
118
Rashid, Jihad, Pg. 147-8.
119
Ibid. See how ideology grew in the Pak/Afghan border region in Part 2, which had Wahhabi/Deobandi
sympathies, and very anti-western rhetoric common from bin Laden.
120
Rashid, Pg. 148. Tahir was also given quarters to live in Kandahar, where Mullah Omar and bin Laden
also had homes.
116

34

the Karimov regime.121 The goals were presented in a rare interview to Voice of
America.122 In it Tahir exclaimed that the group would fight oppression and corruption in
Uzbekistan, and “God willing, we will carry out this jihad to its conclusion.”123
On February 16, 1999, six car bombs detonated in Tashkent in an attempt to
assassinate President Karimov. He escaped but sixteen civilians died and about 100 were
wounded. The attack shocked the Karimov regime, which made broad accusations of all
opposition groups, but specifically accused the IMU for acts of terrorism.124 Although
competing theories still surround the incident strong ties exist to IMU militants as being
the perpetrators.125 Neither Tahir nor Juma were present for the attacks, but Tahir may
have helped to finance it.126 The Uzbek government started a wave of repression and 22
people were found guilty of the bombings.127
As a result of the crackdown against IMU supporters many fled Uzbekistan’s
Fergana valley for Tajikistan’s Tavildara region.128 Reports suggest Juma received as
many as several thousand refugees who were looking for protection and now even more
willing to fight the Karimov regime.129 The IMU kept up the rhetoric by releasing a
statement on 19 March 1999 on Iranian radio. It called for the Karimov regime to resign
or be removed by force and continued,
“the Russian invaders . . . have waged war against Islam. They have massacred more
Muslims than their Bolshevik teachers . . . The Islamic State of Uzbekistan will never
121
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have friendly relations with states which carry out hostile actions against Islam and
130
Muslims, or which have been seizing Muslim lands or have supported those crimes.”

The next IMU actions took place in August 1999. Juma led small-armed groups
from his Tavildara bases into southern Kyrgyzstan territory toward sympathetic enclaves
in the Fergana valley.131 During the incursion IMU fighters were able to kidnap Kyrgyz
officials on 9 August, and four Japanese geologists on 23 August.132 The IMU held as
many as 20 hostages by the end of August, all of which were released for ransom.133 A
Kyrgyz Army offensive was launched to drive the IMU groups back into Tajik territory.
Fighting between the two sides continued till late October when the IMU retreated back
to Tajikistan.134
By this time tensions had risen between the fragile Tajik government and Juma
Namangani. He had opposed the peace deal and was now using Tajik territory as a
forward base. It was at this time that Juma left Tavildara for northern Afghanistan with
his fighters and their families.135 Tahir had brokered a deal where the IMU could use
Afghan territory in exchange for help against Massoud’s Northern Alliance.136
A second similar campaign was launched in August 2000. This time the IMU
groups were better armed and carried out numerous attacks. The same areas near the
enclaves were descended upon again, as were hostages taken, with other IMU groups
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struck near the mountains north of Tashkent.137 Again IMU groups fought and held out
against Uzbek and Kyrgyz government forces. Newspaper reports suggest the IMU was
receiving reinforcement from Tajik officials.138 The IMU was not able to escape
casualties; it is believed to have lost about 150 fighters.139
The two campaigns against Uzbek and Kyrgyz authorities were successful in
stirring up unrest between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Central Asian
governments responded with aggressive measures, particularly Uzbekistan. Outside
observers suggested the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have
“greatly exaggerated” the low-level cross border operations of the IMU in their
justification of repressive measures.140 Still, the IMU was put on the U.S. State
Departments Terrorist Watch List for their activities, and growing ties to al-Qaeda.141
Namangani continued his drug smuggling network during this period. By the
early summer 2001 he is estimated to have overseen up to 70% of opium moved through
Central Asia from Afghanistan.142 Concomitantly, it is believed the IMU changed its
name, to the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, IMT.143 This was seen as reflection of
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Tahir’s wider acceptance of jihad probably stemming from increased time with the
Taliban, and bin Laden.144 Late July 2001 again saw a smaller IMU attacked on the same
Tajik-Kyrgyz border territory.145
By September 2001 the IMU had become a permanent fixture in northern
Afghanistan. Bases had been set up, Tahir and Juma met with high-ranking Taliban
officials and al Qaeda members,146 and the group was heavily involved with the drug
trade. IMU fighters and new recruits trained at camps near the Pakistan/Afghan border, as
well as continuing to fight the Northern Alliance.

The Fall of the IMU: September 11 to 2007
This last phase centers on the defense, defeat, and dispersal of the IMU in Afghanistan
following the U.S. invasion. In October 2001 U.S. strike plans turned to actions.147 In
northern Afghanistan, aiding in the defense of the Taliban and al-Qaeda were IMU
fighters led by Juma Namangani. Their bases in Taloqan, Kunduz, and Mazar-I-Sharif
stood right in the path of U.S. and Northern Alliance forces. Northern Alliance
commanders knew of Namangani’s ‘warrior’ reputation, spread by word of mouth in the
region, since he had led the Taliban forces in 1999 and pushed Northern Alliance fighters
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out of Taloqan.148 Those same commanders believed he was made a Taliban commander
in recent months and put in charge of 2,500 – 5,000 fighters based near Taloqan in
October 2001.149 Expectations of the upcoming battle from those on the ground, and
veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, were that it would be tough.150
Broadly speaking the IMU had been discussed among U.S. military commanders.
In meetings, before and after September 11, involving General Tommy Franks, President
Karimov, and their respective officials, the IMU threat was mentioned.151 Having been
placed on the State Departments Terrorist Watch list in 2000, and an ally of al-Qaeda the
United States was happy to oblige Karimov’s concerns.152 Uzbekistan had been most
enthusiastic for a U.S. strike against Afghanistan since it meant aggressive action might
be taken against the IMU. President Bush cited the IMU publicly in statements prior to
the invasion to help secure Uzbek cooperation in the military campaign with
Afghanistan.153
By 14 November Mazar-I-Sharif and Taloqan had fallen to Northern Allliance
commanders supported by U.S. Special Forces Teams, and Kunduz was surrounded.154
The combination of negotiations and air strikes led to remaining Taliban fighters to
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surrender on 27 November to Uzbek warlord and Northern Alliance commander Abdul
Rashid Dostum.155 The events on the ground occurred so quickly that the few U.S. forces
had trouble containing all of the enemy fighters. Surviving elements of Taliban, alQaeda, and IMU either blended into the surround areas or fled southeast toward the
Pakistan border.156
The death of Juma Namangani, which occurred in November 2001, is an
important event in the history of the IMU.157 Juma’s nephew and former IMU fighter,
Bakhtier Uzakov, says he was killed in an air strike and that he personally buried him in
November 2001. He continues that his uncle’s death has not hurt the organization.158 A
Kyrgyz IMU member, Sheraly Akbotoyev, says he attended Nangani’s funeral at a
mosque on 10 November 2001 in Logar province south of Kabul. He also mentions
Namangani was killed by an air strike near Mazar-I-Sharif.159 Juma’s death along with the
loss of hundreds of IMU fighters and bases crippled the group. It also allowed Tahir
Yuldashev to become the sole leader and decision maker leading the surviving IMU
elements east toward Pakistan.
In late December 2001 Uzbek president Islam Karimov and Tajik president
Rahmonov convened to discuss the U.S. military success in Afghanistan. They both
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‘hailed’ President Bush’s determination to fight terrorism.160 Questioned on the death of
Juma Namangani they welcomed the news of his death. Asked about Yuldashev’s they
both said he would probably regroup in Pakistan.161
The prevailing theory is once forced out of Kunduz many IMU fighters headed
south through Logar and Paktia provinces toward Tora Bora and Gardez.162 After the
intense bombing of Tora Bora in December 2001 remaining Taliban, al-Qaeda, and IMU
elements continued south on two escape routes. One led to the tribal region of Pakistan
the other led to eastern Afghanistan.163 Military intelligence estimates place a large
number of remaining fighters near the Shahikot valley. Operation Anaconda, 2-18 March
2002, was designed to be a quick strike to mop up Taliban, al-Qaeda, and IMU remnants.
There was no evidence of any senior al-Qaeda or Taliban members, but Tahir Yuldashev
was thought to be there.164 The fighting was intense but U.S. forces prevailed. At the
conclusion of the battle Tahir Yuldashev and his remaining IMU fighters are believed to
have escaped east into the tribal areas of Pakistan.
After the Spring of 2002 the IMU appeared to have lost much of its vitality.
Former members thought it safe to reveal the truth about internal relations of the group.
In September 2003, The Washington Post reported that a former IMU member, and
160
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bodyguard to Yuldashev, escaped and returned to Namangan, Uzbekistan. Khasanboy
Sotimov, 27, said,
“all he [Yuldashev] has left are women and old people and injured fighters. The IMU’s back
has been broken. The rest have left him. There is no unity like there used to be.”165

In a March 2004 interview, another IMU defector, Hoyaberda Aripov, said that those
who became disillusioned were killed. Aripov believed he joined for legit reasons.166
Other former members of the IMU corroborate the disillusionment.167 Alibek
Hujayyef and Hassan Boies Saltimov claim they were tricked into joining. At 20,
Hujayyef left home with his girlfriend for Tajikistan because he was told he could make
some money. It was there that he met bearded Uzbek fighters that forced him to become a
member. Hujayyef claims our money and passports were taken and that if we tried to
leave we would be shot. Saltimov also claims he was tricked into joining when he
traveled to Tajikistan for business. He was promoted and made one of Yuldashev’s
personal bodyguards. Saltimov says Yuldashev spoke of
“the injustice in Uzbeksitan and the need to overthrow the government, but first we needed
to help the Taliban take over Afghanistan. Then we would build an Islamic caliphate that
would rule the world.”168

When Saltimov traveled to Taliban controlled Afghanistan in 2000 with other IMU
fighters and their families he met many other Islamic militants from Chechnya, Pakistan,
and the Arab world. Saltimov’s says,
“his disillusionment stemmed from seeing Yuldashev live extravagantly in a large house
with parties, women and television, while other fighters were poor and hungry. Yuldashev
loved power and used religion to try and win control of Uzbekistan.”169
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Saltimov escaped a few days before September 11 and Hujayyef escaped to Pakistan with
many other fighters. Both were given amnesty by the Uzbek government and have
returned to their homes in the Fergana Valley.170 These testimonies suggest internal
cohesion was at times lacking and challenge Tahir’s leadership.
Militant activity in Uzbekistan was down until Spring 2004. On 28-31 March
2004 multiple bombings in Tashkent and subsequent shootouts occurred in which 33
militants died, 7 were women.171 A 19-year-old Uzbek woman who detonated explosives
strapped to her body in Tashkent’s Choru Market carried out one of the March bombings.
The Islamic Jihad Group took responsibility172 for the attack, a suspected radical offshoot
of the IMU.
Later, on 30 July 2004 attacks occurred in Tashkent at the Prosecutor General’s
Office, U.S. Embassy, and Israeli Embassy. Several days after the IMU took
responsibility on a website. Four days earlier the trial for several individuals charged with
the series of bombings in March and April 2004 had begun.173 Experts have described the
above attacks as “freelance, amateur jihadist, . . . not closely aligned with the IMU.”174
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The failed Tashkent attack in 2005 seems to echo this lack of sophistication, and that the
IMU and its offshoots, are in ‘eclipse.’175
Sporadic fighting in 2004-5 in Waziristan, (western Pakistan) revealed IMU
remnants led by Tahir Yuldashev, had been fighting the Pakistani Military.176 Tahir’s
September 2006 threats against the U.S. effort and its allies in Afghanistan, an attempt at
maintaining relevancy, was just fiery rhetoric.177 Overall, as 2007 comes to a close almost
a decade has passed since the conception of the IMU. Its political goals, removal of the
Karimov regime from power, and replacement with an Islamic state for Uzbekistan and
greater Central Asia, have not been fulfilled.

Profile of IMU:
How should the IMU be defined? The IMU is best understood as a group that
tried to cultivate a broader movement. Its two branches, political and military, operated as
two linked networks. Each network developed its goals around its respective leader, Tahir
as political and Juma as military.
The IMU’s ideology is based on Salafi, puritanical, teachings of Islam.178 These
ideas can be traced back to the 1970’s when underground spiritual leaders, such as
Mohammad Rustamov Hindustani, brought them to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.179
Hindustani’s students, namely Allama Rahmatullah, helped to spread these teachings the
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Fergana valley.180 Allama Rahmatullah inspired Tahir Yuldashev and others who would
later become members of the IMU.181 Naumkin argues that the IMU’s ideological origins
can be traced back to the militant organizations in the Fergana valley. It was then that
these organizations, led by Adolat, practiced Islamic puritianism, attempted to assume
responsibility for public order, called for social justice, and advocated state rule by Sharia
law.182 He does stress that there was a ‘power’ component to the militants from the very
beginning.183 They attempted to enforce Islamic norms, trained special squads in policing
and martial arts, stockpiled arms and trained youth how to use them, and advocated the
overthrow of a secular regime by force and intimidation in the form of terror.184 Naumkin
concludes that the Islamic militants not only were Salafis but jihadists, since “they were
committed to violent struggle against a secular regime in the name of Islam.”185 He does
note that the subsequent military actions in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and thus the
armed activity came to dominate over the ideological Salafi activity.186 Still, to argue that
the IMU is void of Islamic sentiment would be incorrect, like most groups it changed
over time. It has become less political in nature, while the militant operations and the
need to fund such activity, with the drug trade, has become more dominant.187 Naumkin
suggests this has become a contentious issue for the top leadership of the IMU about
which direction to continue with.188
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The stated objectives of the IMU are the overthrow of the Karimov regime and
the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. These declarations were formally issued in
1998, and issued again for the August 1999 campaign.189 The objectives are believed to
have widened to bring Islamic government to all of Central Asia in the summer of 2001,
mostly likely as a result of a growing relationship with the Taliban and al Qaeda.190
The IMU has a classic pyramid structure, in which Tahir and Juma are the leaders
and decision makers. The secrecy of the group has inhibited creating a complete roster,
but evidence suggests Yuldashev and Namangani did have deputies. Under Yuldashev
was Zubayr ibn Abdulrahim, head of the Supreme Religious Council.191 Namangani had
at least three lieutenants Abduwali Yuldashev, Azizkhan, and UTO commander Mullo
Safar that served with him.192 A tentative outline of IMU membership is below. Member
strength at its peak was between 500-1000, but estimates reaching 2000 were possible.
The IMU’s periphery support included family members that stayed at their compounds,
and sympathetic villages in the Fergana valley, and Tavildara, Tajikistan.

The IMU:193

Tahir Yuldashev / Juma Namangani
/
|
Zubayr ibn Abdulrahim
Abduwali Yuldashev, Azizkhan, Mullo Safar
Bahrom Abdullev

--

Kazimbek Zakirov, Zahid Dehkanov
|
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|
Zafar Mahmudov, K. Nazarov, T. Nuraliev, Mahamadsobir Mamatov

Tahir Yuldashev was born 2 October 1968, and grew up in Fergane.194 He
attended Bukhara Technological Institute before dropping out.195 He did receive a secular
education before embracing militant ideology. At 24 he led the Namangan Revolt with
other young imams from Namangan.196 As the Phases (above) suggest he spent much of
his life in the company of radical ideas and individuals. But, despite his networking and
oratory skills Namangani’s accomplishments seem to have overshadowed Yuldashev’s.
Juma Namangani’s reputation as a ‘legend’ of Central Asia has aroused much
controversy. The rumors are worth presenting:
“The ghost of the former student at SPTU-28 (special vocational training college No 28)
in the (eastern Uzbek) town of Namangan, former Soviet Army paratrooper, gangland
boss nicknamed Ninja, drug and emerald smuggler, irreconcilable mujahid and master of
partisan warfare, friend of Usama Bin Laden and head of Livo, who was sentenced to
death in absentia by the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan, still haunts Central Asia.”197

He was born 12 June 1969, and little else is known about his childhood.198 He did serve
with the Soviet Army as a paratrooper in Afghanistan. Some reports have him attaining
the rank of sergeant; others say he was a sniper. What can be mentioned is that he served,
roughly 1988-89, in Afghanistan. He was exposed to a declining Soviet Army and in
contrast, ‘inspired’ by the mujahideen.199 He was influential in the region till his death.
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Financial support came early on from lobbying, mostly conducted by Tahir, of
sympathetic people, governments, and intelligence services.200 Drug trafficking has also
provided revenue, conducted by Juma, and steadily increased. Alliances with other
groups also provided benefits such as money donations from Osama bin Laden.201 Since
Tajikistan and Afghanistan had weak infrastructures it was often common to make
exchanges with commodities instead of cash.202 This would also facilitate the drug trade
since Juma could trade in opium/heroin, gold, gems, or arms. Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan used the ultimate network exchange system, hawalas.203 This was a social
system of exchanging money built on trust, family relationships, and regional
affiliations.204 The system was ideal for a lawless state containing a myriad of smuggling
networks.205
Many individuals, groups, and broad movements have associated with the IMU.
However, it is difficult to verify the strength of some of these ties. The strongest support
has obviously come from groups and individuals with direct ties to the Fergana valley,
Tajik Islamic groups/UTO, and Tahir and Juma themselves. Many Uzbek supporters have
found refuge in Tajikistan during the crackdowns of the Karimov regime, and continued
to Afghanistan. Tahir Yuldashev’s time in Peshawar facilitated much association with
Pakistani groups.206 These relationships certainly led to meeting members of the Taliban
and al-Qaeda. One of the most important relationships the IMU had was with al-Qaeda
200
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demonstrated by the fact that the IMU fought with it in Afghanistan after September 11.207
Interaction with Hizb ut Tahrir is likely since both share geography and goals, but hard to
prove. Interaction with Chechen and Uighur separatist groups seems mostly to have been
for exchanging of recruits and training purposes.208 Government officials have interacted
with the IMU such as the Taliban, Tajik officials Nuri and Ziyoyev, and Pakistan’s ISI.209
The latter usually did so clandestinely.
The IMU’s area of operations was Central Asia, to include Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Considerable time was spent in Tajikistan, where it had forward operating
bases, and the majority of its activities were along the southern Fergana valley where
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan meet. The group headquarters was in the northern
Afghanistan cities of Mazar-I-Sharif and Kunduz from 1998-2001. The group also had
offices and residences in Kabul. After the alliance with the Taliban and al-Qaeda it is
thought the IMU used their camps for training.
The major tactics and capabilities of the IMU were centered on small mobile
groups, armed attacks with small arms, and kidnappings. Bombing, as a tactic, was used
only in February 1999 and again in 2004 in combination with suicide attacks.210 Both
occurred in Tashkent. Top IMU leadership was present for neither and this suggests some
element of local operational autonomy. Also, the suicide element in 2004 is a new step
suggesting desperation and/or a more fanatical nature.
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Notebooks found in the region reveal some of the indoctrination and training
Islamic militants went through in the 1990s.211 It is similar to the training and tactics
found in the camps in and along the Pakistan/Afghan border region.212 However, the
introductory nature of the notebooks challenges the threat their students could actually
have been.
As the groups activities progressed (see Phases above) its goals changed. Tahir
and Juma always maintained contact, and collaborated, but there was always distance,
physically and in their relationship. Success was found not on Tahir’s political but Juma’s
criminal front. This orientation and distance created disagreement between Tahir and
Juma about where to lead the group.213

4 Conclusions:
Why did the IMU become more involved with the drug trade? What were the major
smuggling routes, who was involved, and how much financial gain was there? As
mentioned above since the end of the Cold War terrorist and criminal groups had adapted
to their new environment, often by cooperating in the drug trade. The IMU is a clear
example of this change.
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First, the IMU existed in a criminalized world of post-Soviet Central Asia where
“drug trafficking . . . can provide opportunities for insurgent groups.”214 This activity was
heightened for states bordering Afghanistan, which suffered spillover effects of drug
trafficking and warfare.215 Through out the 1990s Afghanistan’s civil war was an example
of armed conflict being extended by a ‘lootable resource’, opium.216 It has also been
argued that during the Tajik Civil War factions turned to the drug trade to finance
military campaigns.217 The weaker parties, which usually rely on the lootable resource,
were the Islamic factions of the UTO; they became involved with the trade. It was these
parties that were allies to Juma’s militants and together both benefited from the trade out
of Afghanistan.
Second, the smuggling routes changed during the 1990s. Most of the
opium/heroin traveled west through Iran, via Turkey and the Balkans, to Western Europe.
The routes changed because of the Balkan conflict, and a crackdown by the Iranian
government.218 Since the Soviet Union no longer existed to impede major shipments the
smuggling routes took a decidedly northern turn, through Central Asia and the Caucasus
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where law enforcement was weak. Organized crime was already prevalent in these
regions and they quickly embraced the opportunity.
A brief mention of specific routes will help illustrate. Drugs would enter
Tajikistan headed for Kyrgyzstan via the Osh-Khorog route.219 By 1998 new routes
through the Garm regions of Tajikistan and Batken of Kyrgyzstan became popular.220
From Osh, Kyrgyzstan and other major hubs in Central Asia most of the drugs travel by
truck through Kazakhstan to Moscow or St. Petersburg where it was redistributed to midlevel dealers for Western Europe.221 The IMU had bases in Garm, and made incursions
into Batken from 1999-2001.
The money being made is what drives the trade. A kilogram of opium cost
roughly $50 in Afghanistan, is $200 in Tajikistan, and $10,000 by the time it reaches
Moscow; and one kilogram of heroin at the Tajik border is $7,000-10,000 and around
$150,000 in Moscow.222 About half of the value is in the consumer countries. But with
Central Asia as one of the poorer regions in the world, and Tajikistan having the lowest
per-capita-income,223 even at the lowest levels the money made is significant.
Third, the triumph of the Taliban over most of Afghan territory was important.
They controlled the southern provinces where most opium is grown, and by 1998
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provided even more stability for the trade to flourish.224 The gradual move north of the
heroin laboratories, where opium becomes heroin, is evidence of the trades growth and
stability.225 The IMU was thus in a perfect position, geographically and socially, to benefit
from the drug trade.
Makarenko and Cornell have championed this argument, that the IMU was more
than just a terrorist group and also deeply involved in the drug trade.226 They continue that
a better understanding of the group’s motivations is derived from this view. Specifically,
Cornell writes,
“The geographic juxtaposition of the IMU’s camps and its activities in the late 1990s
with the main areas of drug trafficking into Kyrgyzstan point, at the very least, to a
symbiosis between the group and drug trafficking networks. However, as the 1999 events
suggest, the IMU has also in all likelihood been a leading actor in its own right in the
drug trade.”227

The timing of the late summer incursions, starting in 1999, concur with the harvesting of
the Afghan opium crop, the well establish links with Tajik officials and Taliban and al
Qaeda members, the groups bases in northern Afghanistan and forward bases in
Tajikistan, and the real purpose of the incursions – to divert attention away from
shipments passing through – all point to the IMU’s involvement in the drug trade.228
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The IMU’s activities, and links to crime and terrorism best place it in the ‘black hole’
area of the Crime Terror Continuum, as a narco-terrorist group.229 The following version
of the CTC contains the IMU and other groups it interacted. This is to provide
perspective on the range of their activities.

Crime Terror Continuum230
Organized Crime
|
alliances with
terrorist group

Terrorism
-

|
use of terror
tactics

CONVERGENCE
|
‘Black Hole’

|
political crime

-

|
alliances with
organized crime

|
use of criminal
activities

|
commercial terrorism

|
|
|
|
Local drug - transnational criminal - IMU - Tajik warlords
mafias
groups

-

|
al Qaeda

This case study gives evidence for the following: The IMU was essentially a
group comprised of two linked networks. Clearly the military wing, led by Juma
Namangani, which conducted narco-terrorist activities, was more successful than Tahir
Yuldashev’s political wing. The group gradually moved from right to left on the CTC.
Juma’s central location seems to be the key to understanding this transition.
229
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Juma’s location to three key elements; coercive power, usually expressed in
violence; tangible goods or commodities, such as narcotics and weapons; and centrally
located in Tajikistan or having forward operating bases there, allowed him to lead his
chain network231 far more effectively. Also, his experience as a veteran from the SovietAfghan War and the Tajik Civil War endowed him with the ability to lead and build trust
with Tajik members who would later play crucial ‘crossover’ roles. His style of
leadership was much more hierarchical and fit the type of smuggling group he was
operating. Finally, he was able to build off success, which furthered his power in the IMU
and influence in the regional drug trade until his death.
Tahir lacked the proximity Juma possessed. However, he was centrally located in
the militant Islamic worlds of Peshawar and later Kabul. The problem was translating a
narrow ideology into effective action, particularly in Uzbekistan. Tahir operated a loose
star network with himself as the main hub. Since it was more decentralized from Juma’s,
and Tahir’s IMU cells had to contend with the respective security services in the
countries they operated in, he only had limited command and control. Success could not
be built upon from sporadic bombings, incursions, and fiery rhetoric. The large mass
arrests and aggressive police tactics also took their toll on IMU members in Uzbekistan.
Since Tahir was not in Uzbekistan to maintain vigilance, the group suffered.232 Instead he
chose to stay in a safer area, Taliban controlled Afghanistan. This lead to him and the
political wing drifting away from their initial national purposes, and taking on the more
global aims of al Qaeda. Which could in the future mean a better chance of success, by
association, rather than continued slow headway in achieving the groups goals in
231

A smuggling, or chain, network is also easier to control since it is based on single node-to-node
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Uzbekistan. Clearly that changed with the U.S. military action in Afghanistan and the
IMU’s political activities, or its splinter groups have been similar to its past ones,
sporadic and unsuccessful.
The two IMU networks combined reveal success in a certain area, the drug trade.
Thus the motivations of the group could be said to have orientated in that direction over
time, while still putting up the “veneer” of Islamic change.233 Also, the testimony of
former members challenges the Islamic vigor of the group, particularly Tahir’s. One
could make a case that the IMU was two groups and not one. Still, the IMU is best
viewed as part of the rising crossover of criminal and terrorist networks in a post-Cold
War world. However, Cronin suggests that a group ceases being a terrorist group when it
makes that shift “to another modus operandi.”234 Exactly when this shift occurs, or did
occur for the IMU requires more research.
Since September 11 many generalizations of terrorism have ruled over more
specific analysis, often at the expense of accuracy. The IMU’s potential has often been
hyped, which benefits both the IMU and its antagonists, by many of these
generalizations.235 At its peak the IMU was certainly a dangerous organization capable of
inflicting damage on economic and political fronts and causing fear. But it is crucial to
examine its actual record of activities, studying its criminal and terrorist networks, rather
than believe the political rhetoric of the Central Asian rulers. What poses, as the biggest
threat to Central Asia is not Islamic militancy, or ideology, but rather the basic human
condition. The continued corruption among the region’s governments, their arrogant
233
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leaders, ethnic divisions, thriving organized crime, all intoxicated with the dream of
power and fear of humiliation.236 Fueling many of these nefarious ‘dealings’ are the
relationships surrounding the drug trade. The trade continues to grease these various
networks with unlimited supplies of money. Thus continuing to keep real progress and
reform from taking hold in the post-Soviet era.
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The civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan were often about lust for power and ethnic conflict rather
than any one particular ideology. One can translate much of the same motivation to the IMU. Oliver Roy
and his analysis of the Tajik Civil War has made this argument.
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